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Abstract 
We experimentally study the effects of introducing a forward market and of increasing the number of 
competitors in a quantity-setting market under strictly convex production costs. Our key interest is to 
better understand which of these two remedies is more effective at enhancing competition. Allaz and 
Vila (1993) theorized that forward markets can have a pro-competitive effect under linear production 
costs. Le Coq and Orzen (2006) and Brandts, Pezanis-Christou and Schram (2008) investigated this and 
related issues experimentally. All three experiments (including ours) support the prediction by Allaz 
and Vila (1993) that introducing a forward market does indeed intensify competition. The results of the 
present study, however, differ from previous experimental results in that we find the forward market to 
be the more effective remedy. Brandts et al. (2008) increase the number of competitors by entry, which 
thus increases the aggregate stock of production assets and makes output cheaper. In contrast, we 
increase the number of competitors by divestiture, which leaves the aggregate stock of production 
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assets constant. Our results address an important policy issue and provide tentative evidence on the 
competition-enhancing effect of forward markets, which can be considered a behavioral remedy. 
 
1. Introduction 
Mitigating market power in the EU markets is a central problem faced by policy makers and 
regulators.1 The European Commission distinguishes two broad types of remedies to address market 
power, structural remedies and behavioral remedies.2 Structural remedies, such as increasing 
competition by forced divestiture (Green, 2006), focus on the removal of the structural causes of 
market power. Behavioral remedies focus on preventing firms to be able to use their market power. The 
European Commission prefers behavioral remedies to structural ones, stating: “Structural remedies can 
only be imposed either where there is no equally effective behavioral remedy or where any equally 
effective behavioral remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the 
structural remedy” (European Commission, 2003, Article 7(1)). Implementing market designs that, by 
modifying the market environment, affect market participants’ behavior indirectly can be thought of as 
a behavioral remedy although we are aware that this may be a misnomer. 
 Allaz and Vila (1993) make the theoretical case for the introduction of a forward market as a 
behavioral remedy that can mitigate market power by enhancing competition. Real forward markets 
may, however, differ from Allaz and Vila’s (1993) analysis of the situation. For example, Allaz and 
Vila (1993) assume linear production costs; however, in many industries, such as in the electricity 
generation industry, costs are strictly convex. Also, Allaz and Vila (1993) assume that competition is a 
one-shot game; however, firms are likely to interact repeatedly in the real world which is why Harvey 
and Hogan (2000) and Kamat and Oren (2004) question the competition-enhancing effect of forward 
markets. Empirical evidence on the competition-enhancing effect of forward markets is scant. Wolak 
(2001) and Van Eijkel and Moraga-Gonzalez (2010) find that forward trading may have increased 
aggregate output in the Australian electricity market and the Dutch gas market, respectively. 
                                                 
1 For example, the European Commission claims that EU electricity markets “… remain national in scope, and generally 
maintain the high level of concentration of the pre-liberalization period. This gives scope for exercising market power” 
(European Commission, 2007a, p. 7). 
2 The European Commission (2006, p. 2) defines structural remedies as “changes to the structure of an undertaking. The 
most obvious one is the divestiture of an existing business,” and behavioral remedies as (p. 8) “a measure that obliges the 
concerned undertaking(s) to act in a specific way.” Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2011, p. 980) characterize behavioral 
remedies as measures that “… effectively tackle the market power concerns potentially raised by mergers without 
destroying efficiency-enhancing synergies.” 
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 Le Coq and Orzen (2006) and Brandts, Pezanis-Christou, and Schram (2008) address the 
competition-enhancing effect of forward markets experimentally.3,4 In line with the predictions of 
Allaz and Vila (1993), they find that introducing forward markets intensifies competition. This effect, 
however, appears weak relative to increasing the number of competitors in the market. Behavioral 
remedies may therefore be less effective than structural remedies (Duso et al., 2011). Indeed, while 
increasing the number of competitors is a suitable benchmark for testing the competition-enhancing 
properties of forward markets, we note that the relative weakness of the forward-market remedy has 
been shown experimentally only for industries with zero production cost (Le Coq and Orzen, 2006) and 
for industries with strictly convex costs for entry by new competitors (Brandts et al., 2008) rather than 
by divestiture. 
 In most capital-intensive industries, short-term costs are positive and strictly convex due to a 
limited stock of (expensive) production assets. For example, the marginal costs of production in the 
electricity generation industry have been characterized as “hockey-stick” shaped, i.e., marginal costs 
are flat but sharply increase when capacity constraints become binding (e.g., Newbery, 2002). Positive 
and strictly convex costs induce producers to make careful decisions, as they can incur considerable 
losses if they produce too much. The results of Le Coq and Orzen (2006) therefore cannot be 
generalized to industries with positive and strictly convex costs. Moreover, we argue that a suitable 
benchmark to study the effect of forward markets in capital-intensive industries is to increase the 
number of competitors by divestiture rather than by entry as in Brandts et al. (2008).5 
 In industries with strictly convex costs, increasing the number of competitors by entry has a 
stronger effect on output than by divestiture. Both remedies increase output due to more competitors 
(the competition-enhancing effect), but introducing a new competitor by entry also increases the 
industry’s stock of aggregate production assets, a consequence of which is that any given aggregate 
level of output becomes cheaper to produce due to the strict convexity of the cost function (the asset 
effect). The resultant increase in aggregate output is therefore a combined effect of more competitors 
(the competition-enhancing effect) and more aggregate production assets (the asset effect).6 As 
                                                 
3 Economics experiments are a form of empirical investigation that allows controlled testing of theoretically predicted 
effects (Rassenti, Smith and Wilson, 2002; Roth, 2002). They allow, in particular, low-cost robustness tests of various 
design and implementation characteristics, and of scenarios that are counterfactual to what currently exists. 
4Another paper addressing forward markets is Ferreira, Kujal and Rassenti (2009). The paper is currently unpublished. We 
comment on it in footnote 33 (results section). 
5 Since Le Coq and Orzen (2006) assume zero production cost, it does not matter whether the number of competitors is 
increased by entry or divestiture.  
6 While increasing the stock of production assets may have positive effects, the costs of creating these assets can be 
considerable. For example, building new power plants in the electricity industry is very costly. Introducing an equal-sized 
new competitor by entry in a market with 3 symmetrical competitors requires an increase in production assets by 33%. In a 
country such as the UK, an increase of that magnitude would correspond to an increase in electricity generation capacity of 
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introducing a forward market requires no investment in new production assets, increasing competition 
by divestiture is a more suitable benchmark than increasing competition by entry.7 
 Moreover, divestiture has played an important role as a structural remedy in increasing competition 
in several markets. For example, the UK addressed market power in the late nineties by coaxing 
dominant electricity generators to divest plants.8 The competition-enhancing effect of adding one more 
competitor through divestiture under Cournot competition between producers with symmetrical convex 
cost functions has been theoretically derived by Vergé (2010). He shows that increasing the number of 
competitors by divestiture decreases the resulting price,9 but his results have, so far, not been tested 
experimentally. 
 We compare experimentally the competition-enhancing effect of a forward market to the 
benchmark of increasing the number of competitors by divestiture. We thus eliminate the asset effect 
confound and isolate the competition effect. To make the comparison meaningful, we draw on Brandts 
et al. (2008) and on Le Coq and Orzen (2006) to design, implement, and parameterize our experiment. 
In fact, we replicate key treatments from those studies, including a benchmark of increasing the number 
of competitors by entry. In the following section we discuss our experimental design (i.e., the basic 
parameterization, treatments, and underlying working hypotheses). In section 3, we summarize the 
experimental procedures. In section 4, we report the results focusing on aggregate output, efficiency, 
and production efficiency. In section 5 we conclude. 
 
2. Experimental design  
As in Brandts et al. (2008) and Le Coq and Orzen (2006), we use Cournot competition with a linear 
demand function. For comparability, we use the same demand function and strictly convex cost 
function for a producer in a market with three competitors that Brandts et al. (2008) used.10 Denoting 
                                                                                                                                                                       
27 GW and would cost – depending on whether the increase is realized by gas, coal or nuclear power plants – between 27 
billion and 189 billion English pounds (Mott MacDonald, 2010, p. 58; Ofgem, 2013, p. 10). Moreover, when competition is 
lacking, yet there is no shortage of electricity production capacity, entrance leads to a wasteful duplication of assets (Green, 
1996). 
7 When marginal costs are not increasing, but constant, it can easily be demonstrated that an increase in competitors lowers 
the price under Cournot competition (e.g., see Varian, 2006, p. 494). In the case of constant marginal costs there is no 
difference in the methods of increasing the number of competitors: either by entry or by divestiture, both result in the same 
decrease in price. 
8 The two dominant electricity generators in the UK, NationalPower and PowerGen, altogether divested 6GW in 1996 and 
another 8GW in 1999, which resulted in lowered concentration (Green, 2006). Belgium, France, Italy, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands are using, or have used, the auctioning of Virtual Power Plants to lower market power (Willems, 2006).  
9 Vergé (2010) focuses on the effect of merger and shows that a merger results in a higher price under the assumption that 
production costs are homogeneous of degree one in quantity and production assets. The cost functions in our experiment 
fulfill this assumption and divestiture thus is predicted to result in a lower price. 
10 Quadratic marginal costs are considered a reasonable approximation to the marginal costs of electricity generators (Green 
and Newbery, 1992; Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002). 
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the output of a single producer as q  and the aggregate output of all (symmetrical) producers in a 
market with n producers as 
1
n
i
Q q n q
=
= = ⋅∑ , we use the demand function [ ] [0,2000 27 ]p Q Max Q= −  
and, in a market with three producers, the cost function 23 1[ ] 2
q
x
c q x
=
= ∑ . In our other computations we 
use the generalized continuous version of this (integer-valued) cost function: 
2 3 2
3 1
[ ] 2 (2 3) (1 3)q
x
c q x q q q
=
= = + +∑  (1) 
 
A market with three competitors is a reasonable approximation for the EU electricity markets in the 
old EU member states. Since the new EU member states have more concentrated electricity markets, 
we also include a market with two competitors as a better approximation.11 We refer to a market with 
two (three, four) competitors as M2 (M3, M4), and to a market with two (three) competitors and a 
forward market as M2F (M3F). We take the stock of aggregate production assets in M3 as the baseline, 
and derive the cost functions of M2 and M4 while keeping the stock of aggregate production assets 
fixed. Therefore, in contrast to Brandts et al. (2008), M4 (M2) is created from M3 by a divestiture 
(merger) followed by a reallocation of assets to restore symmetry.12 In line with Brandts et al. (2008), 
we will refer to the market with four competitors created by entry as M4entry. 
 To derive the cost functions for M2 and M4, we first derive the cost function for a market with one 
producer, using the premise of Perry and Porter (1985, p. 219) that “the new firm should have access to 
the combined productive capacity of both merger partners”. Generally, we will use the notation [ ]nc q  
to refer to the cost function of a producer in a market with n competitors. If n sets of production assets 
of n producers would be merged into one single firm, then, as the cost function is convex, this single 
firm would minimize its costs by dividing output equally over the n sets of production assets. The total 
costs of the single firm would thus be 11[ ] [ ]n nc q n c q= ⋅ ⋅ . Likewise, 11[ ] [ ]y yc q y c q= ⋅ ⋅ , for any strictly 
positive integer y. The right-hand sides of these two equations thus must be equal. Setting these equal 
and rearranging results in: 
[ ] ( / ) [( / ) ]n yc q y n c n y q= ⋅ ⋅  (2) 
 
                                                 
11 See Van Koten and Ortmann (2011), p. 5, and Van Koten and Ortmann (2008) for an overview of the EU member states 
and an explanation of how these numbers were determined. 
12 The treatments with the M3 and M3F markets are thus identical to the ones in Brandts et al. (2008), but not to those with 
the M4 market, as we created M4 by divestiture rather than entry. 
 6/18 
The general equation can now be obtained by substituting y=3 and applying (1):13  
3
2 3 2[ ] (3 / ) [( / 3) ] (2 27) ( 3) (1 3)nc q n c n q n q n q q= ⋅ = + +⋅  (3) 
 
To obtain the cost functions for M2 and M4, we can substitute 2 and 4 for n: 14  
3
2
2[ ] (8 27) (2 3) (1 3)c q q q q= + +  (4) 
3 2
4[ ] (32 27) (4 3) (1 3)c q q q q= + +  (5) 
 
A producer in M4entry (a market with four competitors created by entry as done in Brandts et al. (2008)) 
has the same cost function as a producer in a market with three competitors, M3. The M4entry cost 
function is thus lower and flatter than the one in M4 (a market with four competitors created by 
divestiture), as can be verified by comparing Equation (5) with (1). 
 
Table 1 
Treatments. 
 2 competitors 3 competitors 4 competitors 
Without Forward Market M2# M3* M4† M4entry* 
With Forward Market M2F# M3F* – 
# These treatments were not tested in Brandts et al. (2008). Their inclusion in this study is motivated by the more 
concentrated markets of the new EU member states as well as related treatments in Le Coq and Orzen (2006). More on 
this above (footnote 12) and below in section 4 (results section). 
* These treatments are identical to the ones tested in Brandts et al. (2008). 
† This treatment is different from the one tested in Brandts et al. (2008), as the market has been created from the market 
with three competitors by divestiture, not by entry. 
 
Table 2 
Theoretical predictions. 
                                                 
13 The general equation can be written as a function of the production assets of a producer in a market with n producers 
3 2 2[ ] [ , ] (2 / 27) / (1 / 3) / (1 / 3)n n n nc q c q k q k q k q≡ = ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ , where a producer’s assets are given by 1 /nk n=  and the 
stock of aggregate assets in the market is normalized to 1. This cost function is homogeneous of degree one in output and 
production assets, [ , ] [ , ]n nc q k c q kα α α⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ . Vergé (2010) shows that divestiture decreases the price under these 
conditions. See the online appendix for more details. 
14 To not unduly add to our subjects’ cognitive load, we presented costs that were rounded. The numbers we obtained after 
this rounding procedure were also the numbers we used to calculate the theoretical predictions. As a result of these rounding 
rules, some of the rounded total costs are different, but the discrepancy is negligible. On average the absolute discrepancy is 
0.12%. See Van Koten and Ortmann (2011), p. 10 for the precise rounding rules, and Table 1 in the online appendix for an 
overview of the aggregate cost levels for M2(F), M3(F) and M4. 
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 NE 
M2 
NE 
M2F 
(two Nash-
equilibria) 
NE 
M3 
NE 
M3F 
NE 
M4 
NE 
M4entry 15 
fq  – 2 11 – 5 –   
q  20 20 22 14/1516 15 11 12/1317 
Q  40 40 44 43 45 44 49 
p  920 920 812 839 785 812 677 
Prod.S 31520 31520 28768 29537 27885 28768 27635 
Cons.S 21060 21060 25542 24381 26730 25542 31752 
Total S 52580 52580 54310 53918 54615 54310 59387 
Explanation of column terms: NE stands for the Nash-equilibrium. 
Explanation of row terms: fq stands for the forward output of each producer, q for the total output of forward (if it is 
present) and spot market for each producer, Q  for the total aggregate output of forward (if it is present) and spot market for 
all producers together, p for the price on the spot market, Prod.S for producer surplus, Cons.S for consumer surplus, Total 
S for total surplus. 
 
Table 1 summarizes our treatments and indicates how they compare with Brandts et al. (2008). 
Table 2 contains the Nash-equilibrium (NE) predictions for each treatment; recall that the subjects can 
choose only integer output values.18 The theoretical predictions summarize, for the particular 
parameterizations chosen, the qualitative effect on aggregate output and welfare of introducing a 
forward market on the one hand and of adding one more competitor by divestiture on the other hand. 
Using Q(x) to denote aggregate output in market structure x, the theoretical predictions (hypotheses) 
are summarized in Table 3.19 
  
                                                 
15 Note that, for NE M4entry, our calculations result in some outcomes that are different than those Brandts et al. (2008) 
report. We find that the price is 677 rather than 704 and that producer surplus is 27635 rather than 27638. See Van Koten 
and Ortmann (2011), footnote 22, for an overview of the main (but inconsequential) differences. 
16 One generator produces 15 units, the other two 14 units each.  
17 One generator produces 13 units, the other three produce 12 units each. 
18 See Van Koten and Ortmann (2011), page 11, footnote 20, for more details about the numerical procedure to determine 
the Nash-equilibria.  
19 We also analyze the effects on welfare and efficiency measures, but as welfare – defined as the realized joint consumer 
and producer surplus in the experiment divided by the maximum joint consumer and producer surplus – is strongly affected 
by the level of aggregate output, we expect welfare to follow the results for aggregate output closely. Welfare can also be 
affected by productive efficiency – defined as the aggregate production costs divided by the minimal aggregate production 
costs – but we expect that the effect on productive efficiency is minimal and roughly equal across our treatments. Our 
results confirm these expectations and we thus focus in this paper on the aggregate output. See Van Koten and Ortmann 
(2011) for details on the effect of our treatments on the welfare and productive efficiency measures. 
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Table 3 
Hypotheses. 
H1 Effect of forward market a) Q(M2F) > Q(M2) b) Q(M3F) > Q(M3) 
H2 Effect of adding one competitor by divestiture (benchmark) 
a) Q(M3) > Q(M2) 
b) Q(M4) > Q(M3) 
H3 Effect of forward market relative to benchmark 
a) Q(M2F) = Q(M3) 
b) Q(M3F) > Q(M4) 
H4 
Effect of adding one competitor by 
entry, relative to benchmark and 
relative to forward market  
a) Q(M4entry) > Q(M3) 
b) Q(M4entry) > Q(M4) 
c) Q(M4entry) > Q(M3F) 
 
 Hypothesis H1 predicts the effect of introducing a forward market on aggregate output. Introducing 
a forward market in M2 results in two welfare-rankable Nash-equilibria: one with output 40 (“low”) 
and one with output 44 (“high”). We have no prior, but if both Nash-equilibria are chosen with some 
positive probability, introducing a forward market will have a positive effect on aggregate output 
(H1a). Similarly, in M3, theory predicts that the forward market will have a positive effect on 
aggregate output (H1b). Hypothesis 2 predicts the effect of adding one more competitor by divestiture 
(the benchmark) on aggregate output. The remedy is hypothesized to increase aggregate output both in 
markets M2 (H2a) and M3 (H2b). Hypothesis 3 compares the predicted effect of the forward market 
relative to the benchmark. Since the output in M3 lies between the low and high Nash-equilibria of 
M2F, we cannot make a prediction whether adding a forward market or adding one more competitor by 
divestiture will have the larger effect. Therefore, by the principle of insufficient reason, we hypothesize 
that the outputs will be equal (H3a). In M3, theory predicts that the effect of the forward market will be 
larger than the benchmark (H3b). Hypothesis 4 predicts the effect of adding one more competitor by 
entry on aggregate output. The effect is hypothesized to be strong relative to the aggregate output in 
market M3 (H4a), but also relative to the effect of adding one more competitor by divestiture, M4, 
(H4b) and to introducing a forward market, M3F (H4c). 
 
3. Experimental procedures 
The experimental sessions were conducted in October 2009, December 2009, and April 2010 at 
CERGE-EI in Prague.20 The data for treatment M4entry (implemented in response to a referee request) 
together with additional data on M4, are from additional sessions conducted in January 2013. We 
conducted additional M4 sessions to test for comparability of procedures and subject pools. We 
                                                 
20 See Van Koten and Ortmann (2011), page 13, footnote 25, for details of the treatments.  
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compared the additional data on M4 with the original ones in the earlier sessions in 2009 and 2010 and 
found no statistically significant difference (p=0.20).21 Subjects were students at Charles University or 
at the University of Economics, both located in Prague. A total of 286 students participated in the 
sessions for the treatments shown in Table 1.22 To be conservative, we treat each set of producers (“a 
group”) per treatment as a single data point, resulting in 11 statistically independent observations for 
each of the six treatments reported here. The sessions with (without) a forward market lasted 
approximately two (1.5) hours. The subjects earned on average 382 Czech Koruna per hour, including a 
show-up fee of 100 Koruna. On average subjects earned 640 Koruna.23 The minimum earning was 330 
and the maximum earning was 1080 Koruna. Our experiment was therefore well incentivized on the 
margin. The same experimenter read the (English language) instructions to the subjects for all sessions. 
The market simulation was programmed in Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The demand schedule was 
pre-programmed, and subjects enacted the roles of producers. At the beginning of each session, groups 
of 2, 3 or 4 subjects were formed by random assignment. Group membership stayed fixed during the 
whole session. Subjects were not shown the mathematical formula for the demand schedule but were 
given an earnings table on the screen and as a printout. During the experiment, once subjects had 
submitted their choice for the (forward) spot market, the following outcomes were shown: the 
aggregate output sold, the resulting price per unit on the (forward) spot market, and their own profit, 
marginal cost, and cumulative cost. Subjects were not shown their competitors’ profits, costs, or 
contributions to the aggregate quantity sold. In treatments with two subjects (i.e. M2 and M2F), 
subjects could, however, calculate the competitor’s contribution. 
Each treatment consisted of 24 rounds. Treatments with a forward market contained two periods per 
round: the first for the forward market and the second for the spot market. In the first period, producers 
chose how many units to produce and sell in the forward market. These units were produced and 
delivered to traders. In the forward market, two pre-programmed traders competed in prices for the 
total number of units that were offered.24 Traders were programmed to act rationally. Their actions 
                                                 
21 We used a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test to compare the aggregate output averaged over the last 12 
rounds for each independent observation. 
22 The total of 286 students includes the subjects that participated in the additional sessions for M4 and M4entry. 
23 This amount equals about €26 (and about €36 at official purchasing power parity then, and even more at a student-
specific purchasing power parity). The earnings were thus salient and in line with standard remuneration practices in 
experimental economics. 
24 Le Coq and Orzen (2006) also employed pre-programmed traders. The manner in which traders are represented in the 
experiment should not significantly affect outcomes, as traders are middlemen (between producers in the forward market 
and end demand in the spot market). Earlier experimental evidence indicates that the presence of strategically acting 
middlemen generally does not alter allocations and that the profit of middlemen converges to zero quickly (Plott and Uhl, 
1981). Brandts et al. (2008) use experimental subjects as traders and find that traders earn only a small fraction (about 8%) 
of the profits that producers earn. 
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defined a demand schedule, which we presented to the producers.25 Producers were shown this 
forward-market demand schedule in the first period of each round, which they could use to inform the 
number of units to offer in the forward market. At the end of the period, producers were paid the 
number of units they produced in the forward market times the price per unit, minus their production 
cost. In the second period of each round, producers chose the number of units to produce and sell in the 
spot market. The pre-programmed traders sold all the units they bought. The price per unit was 
determined by substituting the number of units sold by all producers in the forward and spot markets 
together for Q in the demand schedule [ ] [0,2000 27 ]p Q Max Q= − . All producers were paid the number 
of units they produced in the spot market times the price per unit, minus their production cost. 
 
4. Results 
For our statistical tests, we use the last 12 (of 24) rounds of the data. Because the experiment is 
complicated, subjects need, as they do in relatively easy auction experiments (Hertwig and Ortmann, 
2001), several rounds of trading to become familiar with the laboratory environment and before they 
react to the embedded incentives.26 
Following Le Coq and Orzen (2006), we test for deviations from the Nash-equilibrium predictions 
using two-sided Wilcoxon one-sample signed-rank tests, unless indicated otherwise. Since each 
participant took part in one session only (for a robustness-check exception, see footnote 34), data points 
are independent across treatments. None of the subjects went bankrupt. 
In line with Brandts et al. (2008), we test our hypotheses with F-tests based on an OLS regression 
of the dependent variable on the six treatment dummies, M2, M2F, M3, M3F, M4, and M4entry, without 
a constant: 1 2 3 4 5 62 2 3 3 4 4
entryAggregateSupply M M F M M F M Mβ β β β β β ε= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + . 
The error terms are adjusted for clustering at the group level by using the robust Huber-White sandwich 
estimator (Froot, 1989). Figure 1 shows the evolution of total (aggregate) outputs sold per period, 
averaged over groups in each treatment. We report the data for the different treatments as a moving 
average to eliminate some of the round-specific noise: an output is given as the average over the output 
in the present period and the three previous periods. Obviously, this way of visualizing the data has no 
effect on the statistics that follow. Treatments with two competitors are represented by circles, with 
three competitors by triangles, and with four competitors by squares. The treatments without forward 
                                                 
25 See Van Koten and Ortmann (2011), page 14, for details on the pre-programmed traders, and page 45, Appendix F, for 
the consolidated instructions. 
26 However, including all 24 rounds, or only the last 10 rounds as Brandts et al. (2008) did, does not change our results 
qualitatively. In fact, all results remain significant. 
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markets are represented by open circles, triangles or squares, the treatments with forward markets by 
filled circles or triangles. The trade volume in all treatments is initially low,27 but then quickly 
converges to the Nash-equilibrium. Output stabilizes between rounds 8 and 12. 
 
Figure 1 
Aggregate output (moving average over four periods). 
a) M2, M2F, M3 
  
b) M3, M3F, M4, M4entry 
 
 
For the treatments without forward markets, the M2, M3 and M4entry outputs are not significantly 
different from the Nash-equilibrium (NE) predictions (two-sided Wilcoxon one-sample signed-rank 
tests, all p-values > 0.18), whereas the M4 output is significantly higher (p-value = 0.068). For the 
treatments with a forward market, output in M3F is significantly higher than the NE (p-value = 0.004). 
Also, output in M2F is significantly higher than the low NE (p-value = 0.021), but not significantly 
different from the high NE (p-value = 0.248).  
 In line with earlier findings (e.g. Le Coq and Orzen, 2006; Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004), 
when the number of competitors is equal to two (three or four) and there is no forward market, output 
tends to be smaller (larger) than the NE. We see no evidence for stable collusion; indeed our data 
suggest the opposite. Namely, regressing aggregate output on the period of the experiment shows a 
significant upward slope, which suggests that as subjects become more experienced with the task, they 
become less likely to collude. 
                                                 
27 It is likely that these trajectories are anchored by the examples in the instructions in which we used low numbers to 
facilitate understanding of the basic relationships. Loss-averse behavior due to the initially considerable uncertainty could 
be another explanation. 
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Table 4 
Average aggregate output (last 12 rounds). 
 M2 M2F M3 M3F M4 M4entry 
Average aggregate 
output  
39.3 
(5.03) 
46.3 
(6.82) 
44.2 
 (4.06) 
49.6 
(2.01) 
46.2 
(3.26) 
50.4 
(4.35) 
Predicted output (NE) 40 40/44 43 45 44 49 
% of NE prediction 99% 116 %  
/105%
28 
103% 110% 105% 103% 
Number of independent 
observations 
N = 11 N = 11 N = 11 N = 11 N = 11 N = 11 
Results of Brandts et al. (2008) for comparison 
Average aggregate 
output 
  42.5 
(5.57) 
46.6 
(2.91)  
50.9 
(5.86) 
% of NE prediction   99%  104%  104% 
Number of independent 
observations 
  N = 7 N = 6  N = 7 
Results of Le Coq and Orzen (2006) for comparison 
% of NE prediction 93% 94%   114% 
Number of 
observations 
N = 15 N = 15   N = 8 
The shaded columns indicate the treatments that are identical to the ones tested in Brandts et al. (2008). 
 
 Table 4 shows the average aggregate output for the last 12 rounds per treatment group with the 
standard deviation in parentheses.29 Row “% of NE prediction” shows average aggregate output per 
treatment group relative to the NE prediction (which is given in the row above). For comparison 
purposes, average aggregate output and % of NE prediction of Brandts et al. (2008) and Le Coq and 
Orzen (2006) are also shown in Table 4. Using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test to 
compare output in the market with four competitors in our experiment to the output in Brandts et al. 
(2008),30 we find that the average aggregate output is not significantly different when we created the 
market by entry (our M4entry versus their M4entry: 50.4 versus 50.9, p-value = 0.96), although it is 
significantly smaller when we created it by divestiture (our M4 versus their M4entry: 46.2 versus 50.9, 
p-value = 0.06). This suggests that the asset effect has a considerable influence. Our results replicate 
the findings of Brandts et al. (2008) for the treatments without forward markets, as two-sided Wilcoxon 
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests show no significant differences in “% of NE prediction”: our M3 
                                                 
28 The first (second) number in the cell, 116% (105%), gives the percentage of output relative to the low (high) output NE. 
29 The standard error is computed based on the averages for each of the 11 independent groups over the last 12 rounds.  
30 The original group-level data of Brandts et al. (2008) can be found in Appendix 4 of the online document at 
www1.feb.uva.nl/creed/pdffiles/EJappendix2006.pdf. 
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versus their M3 (103% versus 99%, p-value = 0. 56), our M4 versus their M4entry (105% versus 104%, 
p-value = 0. 89) and, as mentioned before, our M4entry versus their M4entry (103% versus 104%, p-value 
=0.96 ). We find, however, a significantly higher average aggregate output in M3F than Brandts et al. 
(our 110% versus their 104%, p-value = 0.02), suggesting a behavioral effect that further strengthens 
the competitive effect of a forward market.31 
 Using the percentage of the NE predictions measure, we observe a larger average aggregate output 
in markets with two competitors than Le Coq and Orzen (2006) report. This conforms to earlier 
theoretical and experimental evidence, which shows that increasingly steeper cost curves lead to more 
competitive outcomes (Davis and Reilly, 2003; Engel, 2007). As robustness tests, we conducted 
treatments without production costs, and found that the average aggregate output was significantly 
lower than in treatments with (strictly convex) production costs. A detailed analysis of these treatments 
can be found in Van Koten and Ortmann (2011, Appendix B.2). Table 5 presents the results of the F-
tests based on OLS regressions, clustered in groups.32 
 
Table 5 
Effects of one more competitor and forward market. 
H1 Effect of forward market a) Q(M2F) > Q(M2) b) Q(M3F) > Q(M3) 
Supported 
Supported 
***(p=0.003) 
***(p<0.001) 
N=  528 (11) 
N=  792 (11) 
H2 Effect of adding one competitor by divestiture (benchmark) 
a) Q(M3) > Q(M2) 
b) Q(M4) > Q(M3) 
Supported 
Supported 
**(p=0.005) 
 * (p=0.100) 
N=  660 (11) 
N=  924 (11) 
H3 Effect forward market relative to benchmark 
a) Q(M2F) = Q(M3) 
b) Q(M3F) > Q(M4) 
Not Rejected 
Supported 
(p=0.374) 
***(p=0.002) 
N=  660 (11) 
N=  924 (11) 
H4 
Effect of adding one competitor 
by entry, relative to benchmark 
and relative to forward market  
a) Q(M4entry) > Q(M3) 
b) Q(M4entry) > Q(M4) 
c) Q(M4entry) > Q(M3F) 
Supported 
Supported 
Not supported 
***(p<0.001) 
***(p=0.005) 
(p=0.252) 
N=  924 (11) 
N=1056 (11) 
N=  924 (11) 
We interpret a direction hypothesis to be “Supported” when our test successfully rejects the opposite postulate. We interpret 
a non-directional hypothesis (H3a) only to be “Not Rejected” when our test fails to reject the postulate. 
N: Number of observations (independent groups) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
                                                 
31 Subjects behave more competitively than NE predicts. Since the NE prediction for M3F is already more competitive than 
the prediction for adding one more competitor by divestiture (M4), this difference is increased by the behavior of our 
subjects. Our use of pre-programmed traders may be the cause of our stronger effect of the forward market compared with 
the results in Brandts et al. (2008). The use of pre-programmed traders reduces the variation in subject choice, and this may 
enable the forward market to exert a stronger, unhindered effect. Admittedly, this argument is speculative.  
32 To test robustness, we also compared the averages for the groups using Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests. The 
hypotheses accepted (rejected) are the same, except that Q(M4) > Q(M3) is no longer supported (p-value= 0.15). Running 
the OLS regression without the treatment on M4entry does not change the significance level of any of the results in 
hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, except that Q(M4) > Q(M3) is, strictly speaking, no longer supported at conventional levels as 
the p-value is now marginally larger than 0.1 (0.101). 
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Our results show that in markets with two competitors, in line with earlier experimental results (Le 
Coq and Orzen, 2006), both introducing a forward market (H1a), and adding one more competitor by 
divestiture (H2a) significantly increase aggregate output. In markets with three competitors, 
introducing a forward market (H1b) and adding one more competitor (H2b) significantly increase 
aggregate output, which is in line with our theoretical prediction and earlier experimental results 
(Brandts et al., 2008).33 Introducing a forward market increases aggregate output significantly more 
than adding one more competitor by divestiture (H3b), which confirms our theoretical prediction. 
Adding one more competitor also increases aggregate output in Brandts et al. (2008), but the effect is 
larger due to the asset effect which, as we have argued, makes production relatively cheaper in M4entry. 
Indeed, our results show that adding one more competitor increases aggregate output significantly more 
when done by entry rather than by divestiture (H4b). Thus adding one more competitor by entry, in line 
with earlier experimental results (Brandts et al., 2008), also increases aggregate output significantly 
(H4a). However, adding one more competitor by entry does not increase aggregate output significantly 
more than does introducing a forward market (H4c). 
Our findings show that without an asset effect, the competition-enhancing effect of introducing a 
forward market compares favorably to adding one more competitor through divestiture. Remarkably, 
especially in light of H4c, in markets with three competitors, the competition-enhancing effect of 
introducing a forward market does not compare negatively to the addition of one more competitor by 
entry, an alternative that not only increases the number of competitors, but also involves an increase in 
production assets. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We experimentally investigated the effects on competition of introducing a forward market. We 
compared the effects to those of the best alternative – reducing concentration by adding an additional 
competitor through divestiture. We find that introducing a forward market and adding an additional 
competitor by divestiture both increase competition, thus supporting the theoretical predictions of Allaz 
                                                 
33 We tested, as a robustness check, if the competitive-enhancing effect is robust when subjects are experienced. To test for 
the effect of experience, 63 subjects that were experienced in the sense that they had participated in the experiment earlier, 
participated in additional sessions in October 2010. (Of course, these data were not included in the statistical evaluation of 
the treatments in Table 1). We became aware of the possibility of such an issue through the working paper by Ferreira, 
Kujal and Rassenti (2009) that started circulating while we were writing our paper. Ferreira et al. (2009) find that forward 
markets have a positive effect on the aggregate output with inexperienced subjects, but no – or a negative – effect with 
experienced subjects. We do not find that experienced subjects produce a lower aggregate output than inexperienced 
subjects. On the contrary, our experienced subjects produce a slightly higher output, which is in line with the experimental 
literature on the effect of experience on public good provision (Ledyard, 1995). For detailed results, see Van Koten and 
Ortmann (2011), p. 39, Appendix D. 
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and Vila (1993) and Vergé (2010), respectively. Our results suggest that the behavioral remedy of 
introducing a forward market in concentrated markets with two or three competitors is an effective 
remedy for countering market power by increasing the aggregate output. This gives tentative support to 
the European Commission’s preference for behavioral remedies such as the introduction of a forward 
market (European Commission, 2003). That introducing a forward market has a competition-enhancing 
effect is in line with the empirical studies of Wolak (2001) and Van Eijkel and Moraga-Gonzalez 
(2010), who found indications that forward trading increased aggregate output in the Australian 
electricity market and the Dutch gas market, respectively.  
 Our results are different from the findings of Brandts et al. (2008), who found in markets with three 
competitors a stronger effect for the structural remedy of adding one more competitor than for the 
behavioral remedy of introducing a forward market. Their result seems driven in part by a confounding 
of competition effect and asset effect. Brandts et al. (2008) add one more competitor by entry, which 
increases both competition and the stock of aggregate production assets. The aggregate cost of 
production is reduced and hence output is increased. The asset effect is influential, as producers face 
steeply increasing costs. Moreover, as a result the welfare effects Brandts et al. (2008) report are not 
conclusive, as they do not incorporate the costs of the increase in the production assets (the cost of 
building extra plants and production facilities). In our study, we control for the asset effect by adding 
one more competitor through divestiture. In addition, we find a stronger behavioral effect of 
introducing a forward market in a market with three competitors. As a result of these two differences, 
we find that the effect of the structural remedy of adding one more competitor is weaker and is now 
dominated by the effect of the behavioral remedy of introducing a forward market. 
At present, the EU has no single policy towards the design of forward markets for electricity. Such 
a policy might improve competition by increasing the use of forward markets and the public 
observability of positions taken in the forward market, often referred to as “market transparency” 
(European Commission, 2007a, p. 127). In Spain and Greece, for example, forward trading is de facto 
forbidden or made impossible by design (European Commission, 2007a, p. 127; European 
Commission, 2007b, p. 50). In contrast, in France the PowerNext exchange market allows for the 
trading of monthly, quarterly and yearly forward and future contracts. Our study suggests that forward 
markets could play a role in enhancing competition in concentrated markets and that the design, or 
evolution, of public forward exchanges such as in France (and many other developed markets) should 
indeed be encouraged. The public observability of forward positions is essential for the competition-
increasing effect of Allaz and Vila (1993) to arise (Hughes and Kao, 1997; Van Eijkel and Moraga-
Gonzalez, 2010). Energy markets are, however, not very transparent as most trading takes place on 
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Over-The-Counter (OTC) markets over different trading platforms and a considerable proportion 
(around 10%) takes places bilaterally without intermediaries (European Commission, 2010, p. 9-11). 
Forward trading positions are thus often not observable. Our results suggest that making the EU 
forward energy markets more transparent could contribute to a more competitive market. 
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